What could a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty look like?

Fossil Free Features is a blog series that seeks to imagine a world free of coal, oil, and gas, and make it feel tangible.

This blog was written by guest authors, Peter Newell, Harro Van Asselt, and Freddie Daley, as part of the Fossil Fuel Treaty initiative's goal to explore different pathways toward a fossil-free future. Views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the stance of the Fossil Fuel Treaty campaign.


Momentum is growing for a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty to provide global oversight of a fair, fast and financed transition away from fossil fuels: the primary cause of climate change. The need for it is clear. There is a ‘production gap’ where countries are planning to produce 110% more fossil fuels by 2030 than is consistent with the goal of the Paris Agreement to keep warming below 1.5°C. 

Such a treaty would complement the Paris Agreement, which fails to even mention fossil fuels. But what would it contain?

In a recent article, we consider options for possible elements of a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, elaborating on the possible institutional mechanisms, principles, procedures, and other elements of a Fossil Fuel Treaty, drawing on relevant precedents and parallels with other treaties and bodies in international environmental law and other issue areas, as well as proposals for alternatives.

What are the objectives of the Fossil Fuel Treaty?

The overall goal of the treaty would be to align fossil fuel production with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. The treaty could be structured around three pillars of commitments (i) ending expansion, (ii) phasing out fossil fuels, and (iii) a global just transition. 

What responsibilities would countries have to fulfill?

Different countries could have different responsibilities and therefore different targets. These differences could be based in the varying historical responsibility of countries for emissions to date, drawing on the climate regime’s principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). 

While all countries have a responsibility to restrict production of fossil fuels, some have more of a responsibility than others – namely wealthy countries that have benefited most from the extraction and combustion of fossil fuels in the past and continue to do so today

Criteria for allocating and sequencing commitments would include that (i) the costs of action should be borne disproportionately by those who have the greatest ability to pay and that are best placed to redirect finance, production, and technology towards lower-carbon alternatives; (ii) the biggest polluters should act first; and (iii) cumulative emissions are assessed to take adequate account of historical responsibility and the use of fossil fuels to date. The process of prioritising cuts as part of securing agreement around sequencing might also consider criteria such as carbon intensity, production costs, and support for climate action.

Research suggests this would mean the wealthiest group of producer nations must cut oil and gas output by 74% by 2030, with a complete phase out by 2034. The poorest nations, by contrast, need to cut oil and gas output by 14% by 2030 with all production ending by 2050. Coal production in developed countries must cease by 2030, while in developing countries coal production must end by 2040. 

Differential time frames could be set for the phaseout, as is common in many multilateral environmental agreements, as well as arms control treaties. Targets would need to be revised and updated in light of new scientific evidence, as well as on the basis of reviews of progress towards achieving the goals of the Fossil Fuel Treaty. A non-regression clause, meanwhile, would seek to lock-in upwards progression in ambition.

What would a treaty like this cover?

To be effective and equitable, a treaty would need to cover all fossil fuels. Given the uneven distribution of fossil fuels among countries, mutually acceptable and agreed reductions across the fuel sources would be necessary, with some countries leaving more coal in the ground and others with greater reserves of oil and gas making cuts to those resources. The need to address all fossil fuels was underscored at the Sharm El-Sheikh Climate Summit, where over 60 countries called for a phase-out of fossil fuels, with coal-dependent countries such as India making a strong claim that the focus should not be solely on coal.

How do we fund a just transition?

The ‘respective capabilities’ component of the CBDR-RC principle would address the uneven capacity of countries to limit production and transition away from fossil fuels and would be the basis for recognising the support they will need to meet obligations under the treaty. One means of reducing financial support to the fossil fuel industry and providing fiscal support to scale up renewables and alternative economic development pathways would be through the creation of a Global Transition Fund. This could be financed by a carbon tax (e.g. on fossil fuel profits) or a redirection of fossil fuel subsidies. Principles for equitably generating and distributing the funds would need to be agreed, as is the case with any multilateral fund, such as the Green Climate Fund.

How would a treaty be implemented?

Ensuring states stick to their commitments under the Fossil Fuel Treaty would require various mechanisms. A reporting and review mechanism would be an essential element. The types of information that could be reported include data on fossil fuels produced in a country in any given year, plans and policies for future production, the development pipeline of oil and gas fields and coal mines, fossil fuel infrastructures, government support for the production of fossil fuels, and information related to governments’ plans for a fair and equitable transition. 

How do we keep countries accountable?

National reporting could draw on information collected through existing transparency arrangements, such as the information collected by the OECD and IEA on fossil fuel subsidies. Information on fossil fuel reserves and their climate impact could build on the Global Registry of Fossil Fuels. Non-compliance could be addressed through ‘soft’ measures such as compliance action plans, the provision of financial support, or capacity-building. ‘Harder’ measures might include the withdrawal of benefits of parties to the treaty. 

Compliance measures can co-exist. For instance, for less developed countries, facilitative measures such as capacity-building and financial support can help overcome concerns that participation in the Fossil Fuel Treaty would be too costly, while ‘harder’ trade measures could reduce the incentive for countries to shirk obligations.

In addition to mechanisms to track the performance of individual countries, and hold them to account, a global mechanism would help to ensure that parties to the Fossil Fuel Treaty, in aggregate, are on track towards achieving the treaty objective. This could sustain political momentum to accelerate the phase-out of fossil fuel production. A few existing multilateral agreements have such an effectiveness review mechanism. These include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which includes a five-yearly review of the operation of the treaty, as well as the Paris Agreement, which provides for a five-yearly ‘global stocktake’ to assess progress towards the treaty’s long-term goals.

In sum

The success of a multilateral supply-side treaty is far from guaranteed amid a turbulent and volatile geopolitical landscape. Yet analysing key dimensions of such an agreement is an important and worthwhile endeavour so that when a political opportunity to advance cooperation on this most critical of issues presents itself, we will have helped to prepare the ground.


About the authors

Peter Newell is Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex and a member of the steering committee of the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty initiative.

Harro van Asselt is Professor of Climate Law and Policy at the University of Eastern Finland and Affiliated Researcher with the Stockholm Environment Institute.

Freddie Daley is a research associate at the Centre for Global Political Economy at the University of Sussex and a researcher with the Rapid Transition Alliance. His research focuses on sustainable behaviour change, supply-side energy policies, and energy transitions. 

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